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THE RIGHT-TO-HONEST-SERVICES
DOCTRINE—ENRON’S FINAL VICTIM:
PURE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS IN
SKILLING V. UNITED STATES
Wesley Burrell*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the October 2009 term, the U.S. Supreme Court heard
argument on the appeal of former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling, in
Skilling v. United States.1 Skilling had appealed on two grounds.
First, he challenged the fairness of his trial in Houston, claiming the
jury was unconstitutionally prejudiced.2 Second, he challenged the
viability of his conviction for “honest services” wire fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 13463 (“§ 1346”), contending the statute was
unconstitutionally vague.4 As to the first ground, the Court ruled in
line with its precedent, deferring to the trial court and finding
Skilling’s jury constitutional, and thus foreclosing his hope for a new
trial.5 Yet, on the second challenge, the Court’s ruling was both more
favorable to Skilling and more notable in light of the Court’s
jurisprudence. Breaking new ground on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, the Court held § 1346 to be so vague as to require a limiting
construction lest it be struck down, despite the fact that it implicates
no secondary civil right or personal liberty.6 On pure vagueness
grounds, the Court circumscribed the conduct criminalized by § 1346
to include only conduct involving bribes and kickbacks, thus
* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Very special thanks to Professor Samuel H.
Pillsbury for his time and guidance. I would also like to thank my wife, Talene Lee, as well as my
family and loved ones for their support and encouragement.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
2. Id. at 2917.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
4. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2925.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2931.
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rendering § 1346 inapplicable to Skilling himself.7 Due to Skilling’s
other convictions, this ruling may have little effect on him. However,
the Court’s holding regarding § 1346 and its determination based on
vagueness are pivotal with respect to the Court’s void-for-vagueness
jurisprudence, and they will certainly be influential on future white
collar criminal prosecution.
II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE CASE
In 2001, the Enron Corporation, the seventh highest-revenuegrossing company in America, and a company whose stock Fortune
magazine named as one of the top-ten stocks likely to last the
decade,8 crashed into bankruptcy.9 Nationwide media coverage of the
crash followed. A federal investigation of what had gone wrong
commenced, and its results revealed an unprecedented web of
complex corporate fraud, at the center of which sat former CEOs
Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling.
Enron formed in 1985.10 It started as a gas-pipeline company,
selling and transporting natural gas in regulated energy markets.11 In
1988, however, then-CEO Lay shifted the company’s strategy.12 As
states began to deregulate energy markets, Lay determined that
Enron should transform itself into a “free-agent merchant”—an
energy broker for the new unregulated energy marketplace.13 Skilling
joined the company in 1990 to facilitate this transformation.14 As
chief executive for Enron’s finance unit, Skilling spearheaded
Enron’s transition from an energy dealer to a commodities trading

7. Id.
8. Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS:
THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER 61, 69 (Nancy B. Rapoport et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (“Enron
was named the ‘most innovative’ company in the United States by Fortune magazine every year
between 1996 and 2001. In mid-August 2000, Fortune magazine named Enron as one of the top
ten stocks that would last the decade because Enron had so successfully transformed itself from a
stodgy gas utility into the largest online broker of energy.” (footnote omitted)).
9. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907; see also LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL, at xii
(2003) (“With $62 billion in assets, this [was] the biggest such filing in U.S. history up to that
time.”).
10. FOX, supra note 9, at vii.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 22. See generally id. at 22–25 (describing the suitability of Enron’s business model
for optimal success in unregulated markets).
14. Id. at 33.
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and financial services company.15 Guided by Skilling, Enron adapted
strategies from the financial industry, such as options, swaps, and
other investment tools, to create a dynamic energy market.16 Skilling
favored an “asset-light” strategy of business.17 He aimed to turn
Enron into a financial company with value based more on intellectual
capital and deal engineering than on physical assets.18
Unknown to analysts or Enron’s investors, however, part of
Skilling’s business strategy included various earning and cash-flow
“levers.”19 These enabled Enron to artificially inflate its earnings
statements and hide large losses to meet its own growth targets and
outside analysts’ expectations.20 Enron could hide debt and losses
through deals with purported third-party entities that were not
actually independent of Enron.21 It also fabricated earnings and
overvalued its assets through a form of accounting called “mark-tomarket.”22 Additionally, it hid failing investments by “parking” them
with investment partners to keep them off quarterly and year-end
balance sheets.23 Together, these levers enabled Enron to prop up its
stock, conceal its debt, and create the appearance of corporate health
and stability.24
By 2000, Skilling’s tactics, coupled with his and Lay’s
leadership, had made Enron the United States’ leading energy
company, with claimed revenues totaling $100.8 billion in 2000, up
750 percent from 1996—unprecedented growth in the energy-andutility industry.25 In January 2001, even after Enron’s stock had split,
it hit $80 per share.26 The following month, Skilling was named
15. Id.
16. Id. at 35–37.
17. Id. at 34.
18. Id.
19. See Superseding Indictment at 8, United States v. Causey, No. H-04-25 (S-2) (S.D. Tex.
July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Indictment].
20. See id.
21. Id. at 12–15.
22. FOX, supra note 9, at 40–42.
23. Indictment, supra note 19, at 16 (noting that Enron “parked” assets by engineering faux
sales of bad assets solely to achieve year-end budget targets).
24. Id. at 7–8.
25. Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and
Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 99–100
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
26. Indictment, supra note 19, at 8.
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CEO, with Lay staying on as chairman of the board.27 However,
Skilling served only six months before resigning and leaving Enron
that August, citing personal reasons.28 By that November, just three
months after Skilling had departed, Enron unraveled.29 The major
credit rating agencies had downgraded Enron’s bonds to “junk”
status, and its stock was trading at sixty-one cents per share.30 In
December 2001, Enron declared bankruptcy.31
The media met Enron’s collapse with virulent outrage and
volumes of negative press.32 A congressional committee performed
an inquiry, the SEC initiated a formal investigation, and the Justice
Department created the Enron Task Force to investigate and
prosecute criminal activity related to Enron’s downfall.33 In 2004, as
a result of the Enron Task Force’s investigation and after numerous
Enron executives had pled guilty, a grand jury indicted Skilling and
Lay.34 Skilling was indicted for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and
conspiracy to commit securities fraud, as well as wire fraud and
securities fraud.35 Skilling’s fraud charges arose from his complicity
in using levers to manipulate Enron’s earnings statements, as well as
the false and misleading disclosures that he authorized on balance
sheets, and financial statements, and those he made personally in his
statements to analysts and ratings agents.36 Additionally, he was
charged with two counts of making false statements to auditors and
ten counts of insider trading.37
Skilling and Lay were to be tried together in Houston.38 But due
to the overwhelming negative sentiment in Houston—the former
location of Enron’s headquarters and, perhaps, the city hardest hit by
27. FOX, supra note 9, at x.
28. Id.
29. Id. at xi–xii.
30. Id. at xii.
31. Id.
32. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2954 (2010).
33. See The Rise and Fall of Enron, PBS ONLINE NEWS HOUR (Jan. 2002),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/infrastructure/power/enron_time.html.
34. Kristen Hays, Enron at Eye Level: A Reporter’s View of the Trials, in ENRON AND
OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER, supra note 8, at 3, 11–15.
35. Indictment, supra note 19, at 36–42, 46–49.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 49–53, 58–60.
38. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907–08 (2010).
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the firm’s collapse—Skilling and Lay moved for a change of venue
in their jury trial.39 The court denied the motion.40 At trial, a jury
found Skilling guilty on all counts except the nine counts of insider
trading that were alleged to have occurred prior to his time as CEO
and Enron’s implosion.41 The jury also found Lay guilty but he died
before sentencing, and the trial judge vacated his conviction.42
Skilling appealed his conviction on two grounds. First, he
argued that the pretrial publicity in Houston was so prejudicial and
pervasive as to raise a presumption of juror prejudice,43 rendering his
trial unconstitutional. Second, he argued that his convictions for
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and for wire fraud itself, under the
“intangible right to honest services” statute, § 1346, could not
stand.44 He argued that the statute was either unconstitutionally vague
or, at least, could not be interpreted to include his actions.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
Skilling’s jury trial to have been constitutional45 and rejected
Skilling’s second argument regarding the honest-services statute’s
vagueness.46 It thereby upheld his convictions. Skilling sought
certiorari and the Supreme Court granted it.47 The Court ruled that
Skilling had received a fair trial.48 However, it vacated the Fifth
Circuit’s opinion with respect to § 1346.
III. SKILLING’S CONVICTION
FOR WIRE FRAUD
After it disposed of Skilling’s first contention of juror prejudice,
the Court addressed his convictions for wire fraud and the contention
that these could not stand because the right-to-honest-services statute
on which they were based was unconstitutionally vague.49 Skilling
had been convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 2908.
Id.
Id. at 2911.
David Ivanovich, The Sentencing of Jeff Skilling, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 24, 2006, at A8.
Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2911.
Id. at 2911, 2925–26.
Id. at 2911–12.
Id. at 2912.
Id.
Id. at 2925.
Id. at 2925–34.
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fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.50 To commit wire fraud, one must
have “devise[d] a[] scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false . . . pretenses, representations,
or promises . . . .”51 Typically, fraud requires that “the victim’s loss
of money or property suppl[y] the defendant’s gain.”52 However, the
honest-services theory of fraud, codified in § 1346, only requires that
the defendant’s fraud deprive the victims of their “intangible right of
honest services.”53 This right results from a fiduciary duty that the
defendant owes to the victims.54 Meanwhile, the defendant’s gain
comes about through some third party, wittingly or unwittingly.55
The prosecutors theorized that the victims of Skilling’s fraud
were Enron’s shareholders and investors.56 Because he had not
fraudulently obtained money or property directly from the investors
and shareholders, Skilling could not have been guilty of money-orproperty wire fraud. He had, however, fraudulently violated his duty
to honestly represent the company’s condition to its shareholders and
investors.57 And in so doing, he had gained for himself $14 million in
salary and $89 million in profits from stock options.58 Under the
prosecution’s theory, Skilling was guilty of wire fraud because he
had deprived his victims of their right to his honest services to make
money for himself. Skilling contended that he could not be guilty,
however, because § 1346 lacked clarity such that it was
unconstitutionally vague and therefore must be voided. In the
alternative, he argued that the statute did not apply to his conduct.59
The Court agreed with Skilling that § 1346 could not encompass his

50. Id. at 2907.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006).
52. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
54. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2930–31.
55. See id. at 2926.
56. Brief for the United States at 50, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (No. 08-1394), 2010 WL
302206 at *50 (“[Skilling] placed his interests in conflict with that of the shareholders, when, for
his own financial benefit, he engaged in an undisclosed scheme to artificially inflate the stock’s
price by deceiving the shareholders and others about the company’s true financial condition.”).
57. See id.
58. Indictment, supra note 19, at 6.
59. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2926.
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conduct, but it stopped short of voiding60 the statute as a whole,
choosing instead to apply a limiting construction.61
A. The Majority’s Opinion on the Right-toHonest-Services Fraud and Vagueness
The majority first reviewed the origins and application of the
right-to-honest-services doctrine.62 The Court noted that the doctrine
initially derived from the disjunctive wording of the wire fraud
statute: from the “scheme . . . to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property.”63 Circuit courts had reasoned that the disjunctive phrasing
conveyed Congress’s intent to outlaw both schemes to defraud
victims of money or property and schemes to defraud victims that
did not involve directly dispossessing them of money or property.64
Over time, this developed into the doctrine of honest-services fraud.
In Skilling, the majority found the core of this doctrine to have been
consistent across circuits despite there being some variation as to its
exact contours and application.65 This doctrine was not based on a
clear statement from Congress, however, and so in 1987, in McNally
v. United States,66 the Supreme Court struck it down.67 There, the
Court applied the rule of lenity in interpreting the wire fraud statute
and eliminated the honest-services doctrine, stating that Congress
would have to be clearer about its intent before the doctrine could be
applied.68 Congress responded a year later by passing § 1346,
explicitly reinstating the honest-services doctrine by name but
providing no further clarification as to its definition, application, or
contours.69 Thus, the majority in Skilling reasoned that Congress’s
60. Id. at 2929.
61. Id. at 2934.
62. Id. at 2926.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 2931.
66. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
67. Id. at 361. McNally actually concerned mail fraud. Id. at 352. However, the phrasing of
mail and wire fraud is identical as to the operative disjunctive underlying honest-services fraud
and so the ruling also applied to wire fraud. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (criminalizing any
“scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property”), with id. § 1343
(criminalizing activity defined identically when the fraud is transmitted by wire, radio, or
television).
68. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.
69. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927.
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intent in defining honest-services fraud under § 1346 was to “refer to
and incorporate the honest-services doctrine recognized in Court of
Appeals’ decisions before McNally.”70
Having established pre-McNally case law as the key for defining
§ 1346, the Court assessed whether the doctrine, so defined, was
unconstitutionally vague. It determined that the doctrine had
sufficient definiteness to (1) provide notice and (2) protect against
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, if its application were
limited to the core conduct that all courts had typically applied it
to—that is to “bribery and kickback schemes.”71 The Court refused to
void the statute as unconstitutionally vague and, instead, applied a
limiting construction so as to restrict the doctrine’s application only
to “offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in
bribery or kickback schemes.”72 It justified this ruling by citing its
obligation to “construe [and] not condemn, Congress’ enactments,”73
noting that it has been the Court’s practice, when possible, to apply a
limiting construction to a problematic statute before striking it as
unconstitutional.74 Outside the bounds of the limiting construction,
the majority conceded that courts were in “considerable disarray over
the statute’s application.”75 To add further clarity to the conduct that
the limiting construction encompassed, the majority explained that
the honest-services doctrine “draws content” from other federal
bribery and kickback statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), and 41 U.S.C. § 52(2).76
Because the government had already conceded that Skilling did
not engage in bribery and that his conduct did not constitute a
kickback scheme, the Court vacated his conviction for honestservices fraud.77 However, the Court remanded his conviction for
conspiracy because the prosecution had charged two alternative
objects of the conspiracy: securities fraud and money-or-property
70. Id. at 2928.
71. Id. at 2933.
72. Id. at 2930.
73. Id. at 2928.
74. Id. at 2929 (“‘The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted
to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S.
648, 657 (1895))).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2933.
77. Id. at 2934.
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wire fraud.78 His conviction for conspiracy will stand if the inclusion
of honest-services wire fraud, now ruled to be inapplicable, with
these alternative objects of conspiracy was a harmless error.79
B. Scalia’s Concurrence on the Right to
Honest-Services Fraud and Vagueness
Scalia concurred in the judgment but objected to the majority’s
application of a limiting construction to save § 1346.80 Citing United
States v. Reese,81 he argued that a “statute that is unconstitutionally
vague cannot be saved by . . . judicial construction that writes in
specific criteria that its text does not contain.”82 Unlike the majority
opinion, the concurrence did not find a consistent core to the preMcNally case law.83 Indeed, the concurrence noted that no court had
ever previously limited the statute to what the majority called the
doctrine’s core conduct.84 Additionally, Scalia pointed out that there
has never been agreement as to the nature of the fiduciary duty to
which the right to honest services applies, where it derives from, or
what constitutes a breach.85 The concurrence thus argued that the
Court should have found the statute void for vagueness.86
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S RULING
ON THE INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO HONEST SERVICES
A. The Court’s New Application of Vagueness
Though the Court vacated Skilling’s conviction for honestservices fraud, many commentators maintain that his other
convictions will likely stand.87 The prosecution’s theory was that

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
82. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Reese, 92 U.S. at 219–21).
83. See id. at 2936.
84. Id. at 2939.
85. Id. at 2936–37.
86. Id. at 2935.
87. See, e.g., Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, Skilling: Is It Really a Game-Changer for
Mail and Wire Fraud Cases?, in SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2010,
at 938 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 23726, 2010) (“For Jeffrey
Skilling, the Supreme Court’s decision may make little difference. . . . [his] numerous other
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Skilling had induced investors to make purchase decisions based on
false information. This conduct fits squarely within the statutory
definition of securities fraud.88 Also, the Court’s decision may not
heavily alter future prosecutions for corruption under § 1346.
Though the doctrine was well known for its versatility and favored
by prosecutors for these characteristics,89 the statute remains intact
with regard to the core conduct of bribery and kickback schemes, and
prosecutors have typically brought § 1346 cases for conduct that
would qualify as bribery or kickbacks.90 Also, although § 1346 is
now limited, other versatile and malleable white-collar criminal
statutes allow the government to prosecute much of the outlying
conduct that § 1346 no longer criminalizes.91
The most exceptional aspect of the Skilling opinion, however, is
not its direct effect on honest-services fraud prosecutions. Skilling
marks a shift in the Supreme Court’s use of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine in criminal cases. Previously, this due process doctrine had
functioned foremost as a means to protect other liberties such as civil
rights, First Amendment liberties, or equal protection concerns.92 In
his 1990 article projecting the likely inapplicability of the doctrine to
another white-collar statute—the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) Act—Joseph Bauerschmidt noted
that in a survey of more than seventy cases citing the void-forvagueness doctrine between 1960 and 1990, courts consistently
applied the doctrine as a means of protecting a secondary right rather

convictions are likely to still stand.”); id. at 935 (“Jeffrey Skilling probably will not escape jailtime given that he was also convicted of multiple other offenses . . . .”).
88. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff (2006).
89. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771
(1980) (“To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius,
our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our true love.”).
90. Stein & Levine, supra note 87, at 938–39 (“[A] review of the more than 600 published
decisions involving the honest-services statute reveals that the overwhelming majority of such
cases involved either allegations of a bribe or kickback, or conduct that was, or could have been,
charged as a traditional wire/mail fraud or under other federal statutes, such as those prohibiting
securities fraud, extortion, and bribery.”).
91. See, e.g., Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).
92. Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, “Mother of Mercy—Is This the End of Rico?”—Justice Scalia
Invites Constitutional Void-for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO “Pattern,” 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1106, 1116 (1990).
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than for pure due process purposes.93 Indeed, with the exception of
Skilling,94 in every case since 1990 in which the Court has considered
the doctrine’s applicability to a criminal statute, the statute in
question has also implicated a secondary injustice from the violation
of a civil right or personal liberty.95 In contrast, in Skilling, the Court
held § 1346 to be so vague as to require a limiting construction
despite the fact that the statute does no injustice to a secondary
liberty. Instead, the Court circumscribed § 1346 purely to protect the
defendant’s due process rights.
The injustice at issue in Skilling is of a different variety than the
injustices at issue in previous void-for-vagueness decisions. In
Chicago v. Morales,96 for example, the Court applied the void-forvagueness doctrine to remedy the injustice of a city anti-loitering
ordinance because the statute impinged on citizens’ right to move
about or loiter.97 In voiding the statute, the Court referred to the
historical use of such loitering statutes as a means to discriminate
against racial minorities and the poor.98 Accordingly, the Court
applied the doctrine to remedy an injustice implicating civil rights
and economic discrimination. In contrast, the Skilling opinion cited
no additional liberty concern. The injustice in Skilling was simply
that “[w]ithout some coherent limiting principle . . . [§ 1346] invites
abuse by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials,
state legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of

93. Id. at 1118–20 (concluding based on Supreme Court precedent to that point, since RICO
did not implicate a secondary personal liberty or civil rights it was probably not susceptible to a
vagueness challenge).
94. One additional void-for-vagueness case does not implicate a secondary right. Posters ‘N’
Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994). However, in Posters ‘N’ Things, the Court did
not hold the statute to be vague in any way.
95. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (considering whether a statute is void for
vagueness because it “imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion”); Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (deciding whether a statute that allegedly violated the defendant’s
First Amendment rights was unconstitutionally vague); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)
(applying the vagueness doctrine to a statute impinging the personal liberty to loiter); Tuilaepa v.
California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (considering whether a California statute is unconstitutionally
vague with respect to defendant’s Constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment);
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (considering a void-for-vagueness challenge
where a statute prohibiting lawyers from making extrajudicial statements to the press violated
lawyers’ First Amendment rights).
96. 527 U.S. 41.
97. Id. at 53, 55–56.
98. Id. at 53 n.20.
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unappealing or ethically questionable conduct”;99 the injustice
remedied in Skilling is vagueness itself and the overcriminalization
that is its result.100
That this injustice occurred in Skilling is evident from the facts
of the case. Enron’s fall was a national tragedy, a corporate
bankruptcy of unparalleled scope.101 It resulted in vehement public
outcry for the responsible parties to be brought to justice. Hence,
since Skilling helmed Enron during its rise and as it began its fall,
prosecutors had heavy incentives to prosecute Skilling for his risky
and legally questionable conduct. But many of the accounting
procedures Skilling implemented at Enron, which his indictment
referenced, were common practices in other U.S. companies.102
Corporate managers at many other U.S. companies likewise shared
his managerial focus on hyping projected accounting numbers to
obscure the underlying economic realities.103 Additionally, many of
the complex business deals Enron engaged in to manipulate its debt
disclosures—particularly its use of Enron-controlled, supposedly
third-party entities (Special Purpose Entities) to conceal losses and
heavy risk—were used by other corporations.104 Most importantly,
99. Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
100. Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 748 (2005) (“Many argue that a good deal of
so-called regulatory or ‘white collar crime’ should fall outside the ambit of the criminal law, to be
dealt with by other bodies of specialized civil law, such as corporate governance, environmental,
or election finance law.”); MARIE GRYPHON, IT’S A CRIME?: FLAWS IN FEDERAL STATUTES
THAT PUNISH STANDARD BUSINESS PRACTICE 2–3 (Manhattan Inst. Ed., 2009), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_12.pdf (noting that injustice results when “prohibited
behaviors are . . . hard to distinguish from the kinds of productive activities that businesspeople
[and government officials] are obligated to engage in” and suggesting that “businesspeople often
try to go up to the line that separates legitimate, if aggressive, business conduct from indictable
behavior without crossing it”).
101. Dan Ackman, Top of the News: Enron Files Chap. 11, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.forbes.com/2001/12/03/1203topnews_print.html (citing Enron’s bankruptcy filing
as—at that time—”the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history”).
102. Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE
FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER, supra note 8, at 105, 110.
103. Id. at 111 (“‘[C]orporate management’s performance is generally measured by
accounting income, not underlying economics. Risk management strategies are therefore directed
at accounting rather than economic performance.’ This alarming statement is representative of the
accounting-driven focus of U.S. managers generally, who all too frequently have little interest in
maintaining controls to monitor their firm’s economic realities.”).
104. See Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future
Enrons?, in ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER,
supra note 8, at 85, 89.

Spring 2011]

SKILLING V. UNITED STATES

1301

however, though prosecutors charged that Skilling had
misrepresented the company’s health, Enron had disclosed the details
of its financial situation to shareholders and the investing public
while under Skilling’s leadership.105 Skilling may have continued to
insist on the healthiness of the company even though he knew that its
health was quite questionable.106 But he also released financial
reports and other public statements sufficient to disclose the actual
state of Enron’s finances.107 Analysts and reporters, through careful
analysis of those documents alone, ascertained Enron’s true financial
situation.108 In fact, it was the reporting on those disclosures that
precipitated Enron’s fall.109 It is therefore plausible that Skilling’s
conduct was not in fact criminal but merely amounted to aggressive
business practices coupled with a CEO’s misguidedly optimistic
projections. Ambiguity regarding the criminality of Skilling’s
conduct may have led prosecutors to rely on § 1346’s ambiguity to
get a conviction.
B. Skilling and Vagueness in
White Collar Crime Generally
Skilling reveals a general problem with criminalization in the
white-collar arena. Two elements that are necessary to curb the
injustice of overcriminalization and limit vagueness in criminal
statutes are (1) scienter and (2) objective criteria that specify the
harm to be protected against.110 These are difficult to apply in the
white-collar arena, however, and are therefore often missing from (or
105. Malcolm Gladwell, Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much Information, in
ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL READER, supra note 8, at
269, 275.
106. See id. at 275.
107. Id. at 276.
108. See id. at 275–76.
109. See id. at 275; see also Joel M. Androphy, The Enron Finale: Justice or Retribution?, 70
TEX. B.J. 32, 33 (2007) (“Skilling and Lay contended that the media reporting [may have] caused
a ‘run on the banks’ and loss of credit and confidence.”).
110. See Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1994) (holding that
scienter and objective criteria are required for assessing whether items qualify as drug
paraphernalia and that these requirements saved a criminal statute from being void for
vagueness); Bauerschmidt, supra note 92, at 1124 (“Statutes with independent scienter
requirements are never vague.”); see also J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment:
Reflections on Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 55 (2007)
(arguing that without proof of “substantial, identifiable harm . . . the government should not resort
to the criminal law”).
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ambiguous in) white-collar criminal statutes. With respect to
scienter, it is hard to prove that defendants like Skilling actually
acted with specific intent to defraud shareholders or to illegally
obtain money or property.111 Often, it is quite likely they did not act
with such intent112 but intended simply to shrewdly and legally
succeed in business or politics. Even when specific intent to defraud
may exist, it can be difficult to prove. In Skilling, the prosecution
lacked any smoking-gun” evidence tying Skilling to much of the
alleged wrongdoing, much less proving scienter.113
With respect to specifying harm, the harm of white-collar
offenses is often difficult to ascertain and to prove. Corrupt conduct
generally causes small individual harms “significant only in the
aggregate,” making the actual cost of corruption difficult to calculate
unless there is some major tragedy such as Enron’s collapse.114
Difficulty in determining the cost, in turn, leads to moral ambiguity
with respect to the conduct itself.115 The complicated nature of
harmful conduct in such cases also makes it difficult to prove to the
jury the specific harm, as was the case in Skilling.116 These
difficulties in ascertaining and proving harm result in Congress
drafting statutes with uncertain scienter requirements, criminalizing
vague and ambiguous harms so as to potentially encompass a broad
array of conduct.117 Congress thereby lets prosecutors determine what
conduct to criminalize. Such statutes shift Congress’s legislative
crime-making power to prosecutors and courts.118 They also facilitate
criminalizing conduct in hindsight, such as what occurred in Skilling.
111. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 195 (1994).
112. Id.
113. See John C. Hueston, Behind the Scenes of the Enron Trail: Creating the Decisive
Moments, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 197 n.3 (2007).
114. Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 509 (2004).
115. Id. at 510.
116. Hueston, supra note 113 at 200 (noting it was a “challenge . . . translating a complicated
earnings manipulation scheme to a Houston jury”).
117. See Strader, supra note 110, at 96 (“The vagueness of many white collar statutes should
be news to no one.”).
118. See id. (“[A]ll too often prosecutors overreach in instances of ambiguous harm and
unproven legal theories.”); see also Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 763 (1999) (“[T]he breadth of
federal criminal law owes far less to legislative choices than to creative judicial interpretations,
spurred on by prosecutors careful to choose the right cases to advance their agendas.”).
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When Congress does not set minimum guidelines to govern law
enforcement, there is no limit to the conduct that can be
criminalized.119
Some commentators suggest additional motives for Congress’s
drafting of ambiguous statutes. Such statutes allow legislators to
avoid blame when laws do not produce desirable results. They enable
legislators to appear tough on crime without requiring careful
consideration of the specific conduct the laws criminalize or the
degree to which the laws encroach on state police powers.
Additionally, legislators can explain ambiguous legislation
differently to different audiences. It thus “satisf[ies] a broader range
of a heterogeneous population.”120 Furthermore, legislators may need
ambiguity simply as a political practicality to build support for
legislation.
Many factors motivate Congress to draft white-collar criminal
statutes ambiguously. For these reasons, and because of the
particular characteristics of white-collar crime discussed above,
Congress has tended to pass ambiguous criminal statutes. Had the
Court struck down § 1346 entirely, the Department of Justice would
have likely sought a replacement with similar flexibility,121 and
Congress would have likely passed one. Perhaps it is partly for this
reason that the Skilling majority did not rule with Scalia’s
concurrence and void the statute entirely. Instead it ruled in line with
Justice O’Connor’s suggestion in Morales,122 applying a limiting
construction with instructions for defining scienter as an “intent to
perform an act in exchange for a benefit”123 and specifying objective

119. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986) (judging the
defendant’s conduct to be criminal for violating the terms of an employee handbook), aff’d, 484
U.S. 19 (1987).
120. Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on
Precision in the Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 550 (1994).
121. Timothy P. O’Toole, The Honest-Services Surplus: Why There’s No Need (or Place) for
a Federal Law Prohibiting “Criminal-esque” Conduct in the Nature of Bribes and Kickbacks, 63
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 49, 59 (2010).
122. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 68 (1999) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he . . .
loitering ordinance could have been construed more narrowly. The term ‘loiter’ might . . . be
construed . . . to mean ‘to remain . . . with no apparent purpose other than to establish control over
identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.”).
123. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 146–47 (2007); see Skilling v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 2896, 2934 (2010) (citing Ganim, 510 F.3d at 147–49, as an example of how § 1346 draws
content from other federal bribery and kickback statutes).
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criteria for assessing the harm by limiting § 1346 to its core conduct
of bribery and kickback schemes.
C. The New Applicability of Vagueness and
Remaining Ambiguity in § 1346
The Court’s limitation of § 1346 as a pure protection of due
process may indicate a shift in its approach to criminal statutes
generally. Most white-collar criminal statutes outlawing corporate or
political crime do not implicate secondary liberties such as civil
rights, First Amendment, or equal protection, despite their broad and
often ambiguous applications. Yet such statutes perpetuate injustices
in their own right. The Court’s decision in Skilling may change the
Court’s consideration of such laws and may expand the applicability
of vagueness challenges in lower courts as well.
But despite the Court’s limitation of § 1346, the underlying
statute’s unchanged ambiguity continues to render its applicability
somewhat uncertain. As Scalia points out, exactly what fiduciary
duties the right to honest services applies to remains uncertain.124
Likewise, while the scienter requirement drawn from bribery or
kickback statutes will give additional contour to § 1346, it is
uncertain whether § 1346’s underlying scienter requirements, such as
the “intent to defraud,”125 survive the application of scienter for
bribery or kickbacks. Is a scheme to defraud simply subsumed into
the intent to receive a bribe or kickback, or is the scheme to defraud
a separate element? If it is separate, how do they interact? Similarly,
it is unclear whether a bribe functions differently under § 1346 than
it would under 18 U.S.C. § 201 (“§ 201”).126 In United States v.
Ganim,127 the Second Circuit determined, pre-Skilling, that it does.128
Section 201 bribery requires that the parties identify the specific act
to be performed in exchange for the bribe when a party makes the
124. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern
Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 455
(1998) (“Although § 1346 may well constitute a clear statement that public officials are to remain
subject to federal anticorruption legislation, relatively little is said about the private fiduciary
context.”).
125. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945) (plurality opinion) (quoting Hygrade
Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502–03 (1925)).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
127. 510 F.3d 134 (2007).
128. Id. at 147–48.
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bribe or gives a promise of property.129 In Ganim, the Court ruled,
however, that § 1346 did not have this “specific act” requirement.130
Indeed, for this reason it is possible that prosecutors could turn to
§ 1346 to get around the “specific act” requirement of § 201.131 Thus,
some ambiguities remain in § 1346 despite the Court’s limiting
construction in Skilling.
D. Skilling and Federalism
There is one additional ambiguity that the Court’s opinion does
not address. A companion case to Skilling, Weyhrauch v. United
States,132 raised the question of whether behavior not criminalized
under a state statute could be criminalized under § 1346.133 The Court
remanded Weyhrauch in light of the ruling in Skilling, without
answering this question.134 The issue of federalism was almost
entirely absent from the opinion in Skilling. The Court only
addressed the issue to note that the remaining utility of § 1346, after
it has been limited to bribery and kickbacks (conduct that other
federal statutes criminalize), is its applicability to state, local, and
private individuals whose conduct would be otherwise unreachable
by federal prosecutors.135 Notwithstanding the myriad other problems
that result from federal intervention into state corruption,136 to permit
§ 1346 to be applicable in the state arena without limiting its
application to conduct that state law criminalizes seems to implicate
some of the same due process concerns that form the basis of the
Court’s decision in Skilling. Indeed, there are “no clear, uniform
national standards of ethics in local politics or corporate governance”
129. Id. at 146–47.
130. Id. at 147.
131. See Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a Meat Axe: Using Honest Services Fraud to
Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 929, 970 (2009).
132. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
133. Weyhrauch v. United States, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (2008).
134. Weyhrauch, 130 S. Ct. 2971.
135. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2934 n.45 (“Overlap with other federal
statutes does not render § 1346 superfluous. . . . [§] 1346’s application to state and local
corruption and to private-sector fraud reaches misconduct that might otherwise go unpunished.”)
136. Federal criminalization of state and local corruption by means of standards that federal
courts and federal prosecutors determine makes state and local officials more accountable to the
federal government than those who voted for them. Moohr, supra note 111, at 175; see also id. at
174 (noting that federal prosecutions of this nature “encourage[ ] citizens to abdicate their
responsibility for self-government at the state and local levels . . . [which] erodes the notion that
the federal government lacks general police powers”).
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to provide notice to defendants or to protect from arbitrary
enforcement when § 1346 extends into the state arena.137 Policing
local politics and corporate governance is traditionally the state’s
domain. Defendants may expect that they are accountable only to the
state law in these areas. The Court did not address this matter,
however. Presumably, it is confident that Skilling and § 1346 itself
provide sufficient notice to potential defendants that corporate
governance is not the state’s exclusive province when it comes to
corruption. Nonetheless, such an apparent invasion of state
sovereignty ought to come by way of a clear statement from
Congress on its intent to do so, rather than from the judiciary.
Section 1346 does not seem to satisfy that requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
It is unclear to what extent the remaining ambiguity of § 1346
will continue to permit unelected prosecutors to determine criminal
conduct.138 Unambiguous language from Congress would have been
ideal. Nonetheless, the Court’s decision brings new life to due
process by limiting § 1346 on purely due process grounds. In so
doing, it affirmed the right to notice and to be protected against
arbitrary prosecution. The Court, likewise, pushed back against
Congress instituting ambiguous criminal statutes and the resulting
trend toward overcriminalization. Its opinion does much to reinforce
judicial power, in particular the judiciary’s power to define law when
Congress will not.

137. Harvey A. Silverglate & Monica R. Shah, The Degradation of the “Void for Vagueness”
Doctrine: Reversing Convictions While Saving the Unfathomable “Honest Services Fraud”
Statute, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 201, 205 (2010).
138. See Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct,
LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Apr. 17, 2003, at 1, 15, available at www.heritage.org/research/
legalissues/lm7.cfm (“Where once the law had strict limits on the capacity of the government to
criminalize conduct, those limits have now evaporated. Society has come, instead to rely on the
‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers.’”).

